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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether a political committee that makes 
highly restricted direct contributions has a First 
Amendment right to engage in unrestricted non-
contribution activities through a separate and 
segregated non-contribution account. 
2. Whether the First Amendment forbids a 
government from restricting political speech based 
on the disclosure interest—an interest in providing 
the electorate with information about the sources of 
election-related spending—including when a more 
narrowly tailored remedy is available. 
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PARTIES TO THE PROCEDINGS 
The Petitioners are Stop This Insanity, Inc., Stop 
This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund, and 
Glengary Inc.  Petitioners were plaintiffs and appell-
ants below.   
The Respondent is the Federal Election Commis-
sion, which was defendant and appellee below.  
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Petitioners Stop This Insanity, Inc. (“STII”) and 
Stop This Insanity, Inc. Employee Leadership Fund 
(“ELF”) respectfully petition this Court for a writ of 
certiorari to review the judgment of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit in this case.  
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opinion of the D.C. Circuit is reported at 761 
F.3d 10 and is reproduced at page 1a of the appendix 
to this petition (“App.”).  The opinion of the District 
Court is reported at 902 F.Supp.2d 23 and 
reproduced at App. 15a.  
JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the D.C. Circuit was entered on 
August 5, 2014.  App. 1a.  This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
The text of the relevant statutes is set forth in 
the appendix to this petition.  App. 71a. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case presents questions of exceptional 
importance on the political speech rights of the 
majority of all PACs.  The Fifth Circuit recently 
opined that contributions designated solely for use in 
independent expenditures1 by hybrid PACs “appears 
                                            
1 An “independent expenditure” means “an expenditure by a 
person—(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate; and (B) that is not made in concert 
or cooperation with or at the request of such candidate, the 
candidate’s authorized political committee, or their agents, or a 
political party committee or its agents.”  52 U.S.C. § 30101(17).   
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destined to be a coming campaign-finance law 
battleground.”  Catholic Leadership Coal. of Tex. v. 
Reisman (“Catholic Leadership Coalition”), 2014 WL 
3930139, at *25 (5th Cir. Aug. 12, 2014).  In that 
case, the Fifth Circuit further deepened a circuit 
split already advanced by the D.C. Circuit’s decision 
in this case. 
ELF is a connected PAC—a political advocacy 
organization that is connected to another 
organization, such as a corporation or a labor union, 
and can make direct contributions to candidates.  
ELF, as a connected PAC, is not required to disclose 
the amount of funds for operating expenses received 
from the organization to which it is connected.  And 
under the Federal Election Commission’s (the 
“Commission”) interpretation of campaign finance 
statutes, ELF’s minor disclosure exemption allows 
the government to tell ELF that it cannot distribute 
a pamphlet or send an email to anyone outside of a 
“restricted class”—comprised mostly of its couple-
dozen employees and their spouses—touting its 
political views and asking for funds to further spread 
its message.  
ELF has sought to become a “hybrid PAC” by 
creating a separate bank account from that used to 
solicit, receive, and expend amount- and source-
restricted funds from its restricted class.  It would 
receive funds from outside its restricted class for that 
non-contribution account2—consistent with the 
                                            
2 Petitioners use the term “non-contribution account,” rather 
than the “independent expenditure-only account” because the 
Commission uses the latter term in referencing Independent 
Expenditure-Only PACs (colloquially known as “Super PACs”) 
and the former term in referring to the separate bank account 
hybrid PACs deposit contributions into “for the purposes of 
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existing regulatory framework created by the 
Commission since Citizens United for precisely this 
activity—and would engage in only non-contribution 
expenditures.  Even if ELF was to eschew the narrow 
disclosure exemption it receives, and announce every 
penny its connected organization, STII, gives it—
including contributions to its candidate-contribution 
activities—under the Commission’s interpretation of 
relevant statutes, ELF still could not form this 
separate account to further its political speech. 
Here, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the Commis-
sion—joining the Second Circuit in a conflict with 
the Tenth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit over whether 
laws capping contributions to hybrid PACs for non-
contribution expenditures and other restrictions on 
non-contribution activities are constitutionally 
permissible.   
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit upheld limitations 
involving constitutionally protected political speech 
rights of an organization, based on the court’s 
wrongly-held belief that the organization’s connected 
corporation is “an unrestrained vehicle” for unlimited 
speech.  In so doing, it became the first federal 
                                                                                         
financing independent expenditures, other advertisements that 
refer to a Federal candidate, and generic voter drives.”  FEC 
STATEMENT ON CAREY V. FEC: REPORTING GUIDANCE FOR 
POLITICAL COMMITTEES THAT MAINTAIN A NON-CONTRIBUTION 
ACCOUNT (Oct. 5, 2011), 
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2011/20111006postcarey.shtml.   
Similarly, Petitioners use the terms “non-contribution 
expenditures,” and “non-contribution activities,” rather than 
“independent expenditures,” and “independent expenditure 
activities,” for continuity and definitional precision as these 
terms include independent expenditures as well as generic 
voter drives, etc.    
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appellate court to elevate the constitutionally 
permissible use of disclosure to a governmental 
interest that, in its own right, may justify a 
restriction on speech.  This reasoning conflicts with a 
ruling by the Fifth Circuit, and, if allowed to stand, 
gives Congress the power to grant a minor disclosure 
exemption to any individual or organization, and 
then restrict its ability to speak, based solely on that 
white elephant gift. 
Over 3,000 connected PACs—constituting more 
than half of all federally registered PACs—are 
restricted from fully expressing their political views 
in the way individuals, other PACs, corporations, 
labor unions, and issue advocacy organizations can.  
This Court’s intervention is needed to put the issues 
here to rest, and to provide guidance to the courts 
below as they wade through a host of federal and 
state provisions limiting the speech of different 
organizational forms—including hybrid PACs—rela-
tive to others.  This case presents the appropriate 
vehicle for providing that guidance. 
For these reasons and those that follow, the 
Court should grant the petition, and reverse the 
judgment below. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Act And Its Effect On ELF’s Speech: 
Under the Federal Election Campaign Act (the 
“Act”), a political committee (“PAC”) may register as 
an organization called a separate segregated fund, 
more commonly known as a “connected PAC.”  52 
U.S.C. § 30118(b).3  Connected PACs are connected 
                                            
3 On August 8, 2014, voting and election provisions located in 
Titles 2 and 42 of the United States Code, including the Federal 
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to other organizations, such as corporations, labor 
unions, and membership or trade associations, and 
they are limited in how and from whom they may 
solicit political contributions, as well as in the 
content and character of their speech.  See § 30118.4    
A connected PAC cannot receive contributions 
from any entity, such as a corporation or union, that 
is not its connected organization.  § 30118(a).5  The 
Act also prohibits a connected PAC from soliciting 
the general public; it may solicit only the statutory 
“restricted class” of its organization, a small subset of 
individuals related to the connected organization, 
like stockholders, members, and certain categories of 
employees.  See § 30118(b)(4)(A)-(C).  Contributions 
that a connected PAC may receive from individuals—
even those designated for non-contribution 
activities—are subject to the same restriction on 
contributions to any “traditional” PAC that may use 
them for candidate-contribution purposes: a cap of 
$5,000 a year.  52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C).  Using the 
funds acquired from the restricted class, connected 
PACs can engage in any political speech, including 
making campaign contributions subject to the 
                                                                                         
Election Campaign Act, were transferred to Title 52.  No 
statutory text was altered.  The new citations are used herein. 
4 In relevant part, a “contribution” includes “any gift, 
subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of 
value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any 
election for Federal office.”  See § 30101(8). 
5 The connected entity may pay for the establishment, 
administration, and solicitation expenses of the connected PAC, 
but such payments are expressly excluded from the definition of 
“contribution” in the Act.  See § 30118(b)(2).  
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applicable limits.  From these limited funds 
contributed by a limited selection of individuals, ELF 
would be expected to fund all of its speech, 
regardless of whether it was a candidate-
contribution or a non-contribution expenditure. 
Individuals and other organizations—including 
non-connected PACs, unions, and corporations—are 
not subject to these burdens on funding for non-
contribution expenditures.  Moreover, PACs are sub-
ject to absolute disclosure; whereas other organiza-
tional forms are subject to disclosure only on the fin-
al, distributed form of its independent expenditures. 
Factual Background: ELF is one of over 3,000 
connected PACs.  ELF’s connected organization is 
STII, a social welfare organization that operates as 
TheTeaParty.net, one of the nation’s leading “Tea 
Party” organizations, and does not make any 
political expenditures or contributions.  ELF was 
founded by employees of STII to increase civic 
engagement and promote their values.  It does not 
coordinate any of its expenditure activities with 
candidates or political party committees or their 
agents.   
ELF currently maintains a direct contribution 
bank account subject to the limitations, prohibitions, 
and reporting requirements of the Act.  It seeks to 
further its own political speech on relevant issues by 
opening a separate non-contribution account to 
solicit funds from the general public to engage in 
non-contribution expenditures from that separate 
account.  Compl. ¶ 28 (filed July 10, 2012).  Plaintiff 
Glengary Inc. seeks to make contributions to ELF in 
excess of current statutory limits for the sole purpose 
of advancing ELF’s ability to engage in non-
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contribution expenditures.  Id. at ¶¶ 25, 42, 69-70.  
Thus, a “non-contribution account” would allow ELF 
to solicit and receive contributions from outside of its 
restricted class, in any amount, and from any 
permissible source and use those funds for non-
contribution speech, but not to provide contributions 
to candidates.6  ELF does not dispute that 
contributions and expenditures from this account 
would be subject to the reporting requirements at 52 
U.S.C. § 30104(a), 11 C.F.R. § 100.19, and 11 C.F.R. 
§ 104.4.  Id. at ¶ 2.  Nor does ELF assert that the 
statutory exemption from the definition of 
“contribution” for connected organization funds paid 
on behalf of the connected PAC necessarily extends 
to non-contribution accounts.  Id. at ¶ 12.  The 
traditional or “restricted class” bank account would 
continue to be used for directly contributing to 
federal candidates.  It also would continue to be 
subject to the broad restrictions on solicitation to 
only the restricted class, existing amount and source 
limits, and regular reporting requirements.  Id. at ¶¶ 
9, 23.    
After this Court’s decision in Citizens United v. 
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and the Commission’s 
consent settlement in Carey v. FEC, 791 F.Supp.2d 
121 (D.D.C. 2011),7 ELF believed that its First 
Amendment rights permit it to operate a “hybrid” 
PAC—one with a restricted account and a separate 
non-contribution account.  But ELF believed that it 
risked prosecution under the Act if it solicited 
contributions from outside the restricted class, even 
                                            
6 Non-contribution accounts also are commonly referred to as 
“Carey accounts” by the regulated community. 
7 See FEC STATEMENT ON CAREY V. FEC, supra note 2. 
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if those funds were solicited into and solely used 
through a segregated non-contribution account 
consistent with existing regulations.  To alleviate its 
concerns, ELF submitted an advisory opinion request 
to the Commission, AOR 2012-01.  Id., Ex. A.  The 
request asked whether “a connected PAC” may 
establish a non-contribution account “to solicit and 
accept contributions from the general public, corp-
orations, and unions not subject to the restrictions of 
[52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(4)(a)(i)] and [52 U.S.C. § 
30118(b)(4)(B)].”  Id. at 1, 4.  The next month, the 
Commission issued two opposing draft advisory 
opinions.   
Draft Advisory Opinion A (“Draft A”), concluded 
that ELF could “establish a non-contribution account 
and solicit and accept unlimited contributions from 
individuals, other political committees, corporations, 
and labor organizations” in addition to STII and its 
restricted class, provided that ELF continued to 
adhere to the existing restrictions on soliciting 
employees.  Id., Ex. B at 2.  Draft A also looked to the 
Commission’s recent consent judgment in Carey, 
which stated that the Commission would no longer 
enforce regulatory provisions that “prohibit non-
connected political committees from accepting 
contributions from corporations and labor 
organizations” nor “limit the amounts permissible 
sources may contribute to such accounts.”  Id. at 6.   
That connected PACs operate differently than 
non-connected committees was immaterial to the 
constitutionally protected speech at issue.  Even 
though connected PACs can have their operating 
costs paid by the connected organization, Draft A 
stated that the differences between the two 
structures did not create a different risk of quid pro 
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quo corruption or the appearance of corruption.  Id. 
at 6-7.  Accordingly, there was no compelling 
government interest in restricting ELF’s ability to 
organize itself as a hybrid PAC that would operate 
one account to accept direct candidate-contributable 
funds from the restricted class, and a second, non-
contribution account to receive unlimited 
contributions for independent expenditures.  Id. at 8.   
Draft Advisory Opinion B (“Draft B”) emphasized 
the differences between connected and non-connected 
PACs—in particular, the connected PAC’s ability to 
have operating costs paid by the organization to 
which it was connected without disclosing such costs 
because Congress intentionally exempted them from 
the definition of contribution.  Id., Ex. C at 6-8.  
Thus, the contribution restrictions purportedly were 
constitutionally permissible.  Id. at 12.  Draft B 
found the second issue, the solicitation prohibition, 
was moot in light of how it resolved the first.  Id. at 
13.   
The Commission later certified that it failed on a 
vote of 3-3 to approve either of the advisory opinions.  
Id., Ex. D at 1.  Accordingly, no four-vote, binding 
advisory opinion was issued, and ELF remained at 
risk of prosecution if it operated a non-contribution 
account.  Id. at ¶ 35.  Even the Commission itself is 
divided on this issue.  
Because of the Commission’s failure to issue a 
binding advisory opinion, ELF abstained from speech 
during the 2012 election season in order to avoid 
prosecution.  Due to its small restricted class and the 
Act’s restrictions on its speech and association, ELF 
could not raise sufficient funds to run non-
contribution expenditure campaigns.  See id. at ¶ 38.    
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The Proceedings Below: In June 2012, ELF, 
STII, and Glengary Inc.—as well as two individuals 
who sought to make contributions designated for 
non-contribution expenditures in excess of current 
statutory limits to ELF8—filed a complaint 
requesting declaratory and injunctive relief to 
prevent the Commission from enforcing portions of 
the Act as applied to them.   
ELF moved for a preliminary injunction shortly 
thereafter.  See Pl.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. (filed July 18, 
2012).  In response, the Commission moved for 
dismissal as a matter of law.  See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 
(filed Sept. 25, 2012).      
On November 6, 2012, the district court disposed 
of both motions through an order denying ELF’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction and granting the 
Commission’s motion to dismiss.  App. 15-70a.  The 
court recognized it was “not the [c]ourt’s prerogative 
to question the authority of” the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Citizens United, but relying heavily on 
Justice Stevens’ “piercing dissent” in Citizens United, 
ruled that “[w]hen a single entity is allowed to make 
both limited and direct contributions and unlimited 
independent expenditures, keeping the bank 
accounts for those two purposes separate is simply 
insufficient to overcome the appearance that the 
                                            
8 The two individuals were Todd Cefaratti, Director and Officer 
(President) of STII and a member of the restricted class; and 
Ladd Ehlinger, a member of the general public.  See Compl. ¶¶ 
19, 26, 27, 66-68.  These individuals no longer are parties to 
this case as the D.C. Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over 
their claims as they “were not made through the en banc 
certification process prescribed in 2 U.S.C. § 437h.”  App. 5a n.1 
(citing Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). 
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entity is in cahoots with the candidates and parties 
that it coordinates with and supports.”  App. 54-55a, 
64a; see also App. 47a, 34-35a n.13.  The court 
pushed further, stating that the reasoning 
underlying constitutional protection for hybrid PACs 
“is naïve and simply out of touch with the American 
public’s clear disillusionment with the massive 
amounts of private money that have dominated the 
political system, particularly since Citizens United.”  
App.55a. For that reason, it ruled that the 
contribution and solicitation restrictions do not 
violate the First Amendment, as applied to ELF.  
App. 67-68a.   
ELF timely filed a notice of appeal on January 2, 
2013.  On August 5, 2014, the D.C. Circuit ruled in 
favor of the Commission, holding that ELF had no 
right to speak due to the connected PAC form being a 
purported “statutory artifact,” and the purported fact 
that its connected organization, STII, “is already 
capable of sweeping solicitation” and “unrestrained” 
speech.”  App. 13a, 2a.  The court dismissed the fact 
that ELF is a separate corporation with its own free 
speech rights, or that STII has a right not to speak, 
and even applied a lower level of scrutiny based on 
its belief that there no longer is a practical need to 
organize in this way.  App. 10a (“this idiosyncratic 
and outmoded congressional arrangement is not 
deserving of the closest sort of scrutiny”).  Thus, the 
court determined the constitutional political speech 
rights of an organization based on its wrongly-held 
belief that the organization’s choice of form is not a 
practical vehicle for speech. 
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
This case presents critical issues for review on 
which the circuits are intractably divided.  First, the 
circuits are divided on whether segregated non-
contribution accounts sufficiently address any 
anticorruption rationale for limiting the non-
contribution activities of hybrid PACs.  Second, the 
circuits are divided on whether a disclosure 
interest—separate from its permissible use as a tool 
of anti-corruption in providing the electorate with 
information about the sources of election-related 
spending—justifies restrictions on hybrid PACs’ non-
contribution activities, and ultimately that of other 
organizational forms.   
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit’s decision conflicts 
with this Court’s decision in Citizens United and 
others that the government cannot restrict political 
speech because of the speaker’s organizational 
identity.  Similarly, it conflicts with this Court’s 
decision in Citizens United that non-contribution 
expenditures and their attendant fundraising 
activities do not implicate the anticorruption interest 
as a matter of law.  Lastly, the D.C. Circuit’s 
definition of the anticorruption interest to include 
within its rationale a disclosure interest runs 
directly counter to this Court’s decision in Citizens 
United and others that the anticorruption interest is 
limited to quid pro quo corruption. 
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I. THE CIRCUITS ARE INTRACTABLY DIVID-
ED ON WHETHER A PAC THAT MAKES 
RESTRICTED DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS 
MAY ENGAGE IN UNRESTRICTED NON-
CONTRIBUTION ACTIVITIES WITH A 
SEPARATE ACCOUNT.   
Citizens United resolved the right of 
corporations, unions, nonprofits, and other 
associations to make non-contribution expenditures 
without limits as to their source and amount.  
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 345, 364-65.  Courts 
after Citizens United then addressed the next logical 
question: whether limitations on contributions to 
organizations that make only non-contribution ex-
penditures are constitutional.  The courts uniformly 
responded by striking down such restrictions.  See 
Fund For La.’s Future v. La. Bd. of Ethics, 2014 WL 
1764781, at *7 (E.D. La. May 2, 2014) (cataloguing 
cases); see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 
1442 n.2 (2014) (“A ‘Super PAC’ is a PAC that makes 
only independent expenditures . . . .  The base and 
aggregate limits govern contributions to traditional 
PACs, but not to independent expenditure PACs.”).   
Now, as recently forewarned by the Fifth Circuit, 
contributions designated for use in non-contribution 
expenditures by hybrid PACs to accounts restricted 
for that purpose “appears destined to be a coming 
campaign-finance law battleground.”  Catholic Lead-
ership Coalition, 2014 WL 3930139, at *25.  This 
case is that prediction realized.   
The lines drawn by the circuits are twofold.  
First, the circuits are divided on whether the 
existence of a segregated non-contribution account 
eliminates the government’s interest in preventing 
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actual or apparent corruption (the “anticorruption 
interest”)—whether limited to quid pro quo 
corruption or broadly construed as including 
disclosure as held by the court below.  Compare 
Republican Party of N.M. v. King (“Republican Party 
of New Mexico”), 741 F.3d 1089, 1097-1101 (10th Cir. 
2013) with Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell 
(“Vermont Right to Life”), 758 F.3d 118, 140-45 (2d 
Cir. July 2, 2014); and Stop This Insanity, App. 12-
13a.  Second, the circuits are divided on whether the 
disclosure interest justifies restrictions on hybrid 
PACs’ non-contribution activities.  Compare Catholic 
Leadership Coalition, 2014 WL 3930139, at *15-16 
and Ala. Democratic Conference v. Broussard 
(“Alabama Democratic Conference”), 541 F. App’x 
931, 933 (11th Cir. 2013) with Stop This Insanity, 
App. 12-13a. 
A. The D.C. and Second Circuits Directly 
Conflict with the Fifth and Tenth 
Circuits on Whether Hybrid PACs 
Can Be Prohibited. 
1. The D.C. Circuit’s decision aligns with the 
Second Circuit in deepening a direct conflict with the 
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Republican Party of New 
Mexico and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Catholic 
Leadership Coalition that laws capping contributions 
to non-contribution accounts of hybrid PACs and 
other restrictions are constitutionally impermissible.   
The Tenth Circuit in Republican Party of New 
Mexico analyzed the constitutionality of state laws 
prohibiting the solicitation, contribution, and 
acceptance of funds greater than $5,000 to PACs—
including hybrid PACs—that were designated for 
non-contribution expenditures.  741 F.3d at 1091.  
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Granting the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction, the 
court expressly rejected the district court’s ruling in 
this case that a hybrid PAC’s use of separate bank 
accounts for direct contributions and non-
contribution expenditures was insufficient to 
overcome the appearance of quid pro quo corruption.  
Id. at 1101 (“Stop This Insanity does not offer a 
compelling rationale why combining two activities, 
neither of which by itself is corrupting, into a single 
entity suddenly increases the risk of real or apparent 
quid pro quo corruption.”).   
The court ruled that after Citizens United, a 
hybrid PAC’s “direct contribution does not alter the 
non-coordinated nature of its independent 
expenditures; there still must be some attendant 
coordination with the candidate or political party to 
make corruption real or apparent.”  Id.9  The court 
also reasoned that in any event, the government’s 
anticorruption interest with respect to hybrid PACs 
was satisfied through both direct contribution limits 
and anti-coordination laws.  Id. at 1097, 1101.  
In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit also disagreed 
with the Eleventh Circuit’s approach—in an 
unpublished disposition—of treating corruption as a 
fact based inquiry: “Citizens United did not treat 
corruption as a fact question to be resolved on a case-
by-case basis.  Instead, the Court considered whether 
                                            
9 See also Lair v. Murry, 871 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1068 (D. Mont. 
2012) (striking down state statute that prevented corporations 
from making contributions to hybrid PACs designated for 
independent expenditures); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 
2012 WL 177414, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012) (striking 
down contribution limit as it applied to contributions to hybrid 
PACs designated for independent expenditures).  
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independent speech is the type that poses a risk of 
quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.”  
Id. at 1096 n.4 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 
360).10  Further, the court rejected the Eleventh 
Circuit’s suggestion that hybrid PACs could pose a 
unique risk of circumvention of individual contri-
bution limits because that scenario “concerns only 
the control over the PAC’s agenda.  It does not affect 
the funds available in the PAC’s hard-money 
account, which is subject to strict restrictions on the 
amount it may raise from a single donor and 
contribute to single candidate.”  Id. at 1102 n.9.   
                                            
10 The Eleventh Circuit, in Alabama Democratic Conference 
opinion, considered whether a ban on transfers between PACs 
was unconstitutional as applied to a hybrid PAC that wanted to 
receive funds from other PACs, which it would then deposit into 
a separate bank account used only for non-contribution 
expenditures.  541 F. App’x at 932.  The court held that in the 
as-applied challenge, whether separate accounts eliminated all 
corruption concerns was a question of fact and the state had 
produced sufficient evidence below to withstand summary 
judgment and remanded the case.  Id. at 934-36.  In so holding, 
the court held at that stage of the proceedings, Citizens United 
did not render the law unconstitutional because “[i]n 
prohibiting limits on independent expenditures, Citizens United 
heavily emphasized the independent, non-coordinated nature of 
those expenditures, which alleviates concerns about 
corruption.”  Id. at 935.  Thus, the court reasoned, “[w]hen an 
organization engages in independent expenditures as well as 
campaign contributions . . . its independence may be called into 
question and concerns of corruption may reappear.  At the very 
least, the public may believe that corruption continues to exist, 
despite the use of separate bank accounts, because both 
accounts are controlled and can be coordinated by the same 
entity.”  Id.  
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Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Catholic 
Leadership Coalition considered facial and as applied 
challenges to state laws banning a type of state PAC, 
which made both non-contribution expenditures and 
direct contributions, from exceeding $500 in 
contributions and expenditures until sixty days after 
it appointed a treasurer.  Id. at *1-5.  Relying 
primarily on Citizens United and McCutcheon, the 
court struck down the 60-day, 500-dollar limit 
because it did not directly combat corruption and 
rejected the state’s arguments that it was properly 
tailored because interested speakers had other 
opportunities for speaking during the 60-day period.  
Id. at *14, *16-*18 & n.27.  Similarly, the court held 
that whatever disclosure interest the state had, it 
was insufficient to justify the limitation.  Id. at *15.  
The court also questioned if the D.C. Circuit’s 
expansion of the anticorruption interest to include 
disclosure in this case “is permissible at all,” but held 
that in any event, it was not properly tailored as the 
state could address any “loopholes” by strengthening 
its disclosure requirements.  Id.   
The Second Circuit went the other way.  In 
Vermont Right to Life, the court analyzed an as-
applied challenge to a state law setting a $2,000 
limit on contributions to PACs from a single source 
in any two-year general election cycle.  758 F.3d at 
139.  After finding that the PAC was a de facto 
hybrid PAC and not a true independent expenditure 
only PAC because it was enmeshed financially and 
organizationally with another PAC that made direct 
contributions,11 the court, citing the district court’s 
                                            
11 But see N. Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274 
(4th Cir. 2008).  In Leake, the Fourth Circuit rejected the state’s 
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opinion here, held that restrictions on all hybrid 
PACs could be justified because having separate 
accounts, while potentially relevant, “does not 
prevent coordinated expenditures—whereby funds 
are spent in coordination with the candidate.”  758 
F.3d at 141, 145.       
The D.C. Circuit’s decision below similarly held 
that restrictions on solicitations and contributions 
can validly prohibit a PAC from creating a non-
contribution account.  The court reasoned that the 
decision to form a connected PAC subject to these 
restrictions was purely voluntary and an attempt to 
avoid disclosure requirements.  App. 8-10a; see also 
App. 5a, 12a.  Conflating the rights of STII and ELF, 
it also asserted that nothing prevented STII from 
speaking on ELF’s behalf or restricted amount or 
manner in which STII could spend money.  App. 7-
8a, 11a.  
2. In the process, the D.C. Circuit’s decision 
resulted in a second circuit split.  The decision 
conflicts with the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Catholic 
Leadership Coalition, and the Eleventh Circuit’s 
ruling in Alabama Democratic Conference that the 
disclosure interest cannot justify restrictions on 
                                                                                         
similar argument that a PAC was not actually an independent 
expenditure committee because it was “closely intertwined” 
with related PACs.  Rather, even if it “share[s] staff and 
facilities with its sister and parent entities, it is independent as 
a matter of law.”  Id. at 294 n.8.  The court also recognized that 
the state was essentially requesting it to pierce the corporate 
veil, but it “decline[d] to do so particularly absent any evidence 
that the plaintiffs are abusing their legal forms or any legal 
authority that considers [political committees] and their 
sponsoring corporation as identical entities.”  Id. (quotation and 
marks omitted).  
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funds given to hybrid PACs for non-contribution 
expenditures.  See App. 12-13a. 
The district court here had relied on Justice 
Stevens’s dissent in Citizen’s United to find that the 
anti-corruption interest justified the restrictions at 
issue here.  App. 47a, 55-56a.  The Commission itself 
abandoned that rationale on appeal, instead arguing 
that the disclosure interest justified restrictions on 
solicitation and contributions.  The D.C. Circuit 
agreed, ruling in direct conflict with this court that 
“the evolving technological and political landscape 
has altered the scope of the anticorruption interest” 
such that it is not so “anemic” as to be limited to quid 
pro quo corruption.  App. 12a.  It then characterized 
McCutcheon as “intimat[ing] disclosure is an obvious 
antidote to the anticorruption rationale,” and defined 
that rationale with unprecedented breadth in 
holding that the disclosure interest falls within it.  
See App. 12a.   
Using this newly fashioned interest, the court 
justified restrictions on ELF’s non-contribution 
activities because striking them down would “stifle 
the government’s ability to achieve [its] endeavor” in 
“protecting the First Amendment rights of the public 
to know the identity of those who seek to influence 
their vote.”  App. 13-14a.  But that reasoning stood 
against the Eleventh Circuit’s in its unpublished 
disposition.  Alabama Democratic Conference, 541 F. 
App’x at 933 (this Court only has upheld disclosure 
requirements because they are “a less restrictive 
alternative to more comprehensive regulations of 
speech” and “has never held that a government 
interest in transparency is sufficient to justify limits 
on contributions or expenditures.”).  And the Fifth 
Circuit followed suit, in its precedential decision, 
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expressly disagreeing with the D.C. Circuit’s 
reasoning on the disclosure interest here.  Catholic 
Leadership Coalition, 2014 WL 3930139, at *15. 
In sum, fundamental disagreements exist among 
at least four circuits regarding the constitutionality 
of restrictions on hybrid PACs’ non-contribution 
activities.  This level of uncertainty and patchwork 
constitutional protections for core political speech 
across the circuits confirm the urgent need for this 
Court’s intervention.  
B. The Anticorruption And Disclosure 
Interests Do Not Justify Restricting 
Non-coordinated Spending And 
Soliciting For Non-Contribution 
Expenditures. 
Citizens United and McCutcheon clarified that 
there is only one governmental interest that may 
justify restrictions on political speech in connection 
with the campaign finance regime: preventing the 
appearance of, or actual, quid pro quo corruption.  
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359; McCutcheon, 134 
S.Ct. at 1450-51.  Mere ingratiation and access do 
not suffice.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359-60; 
McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1441, 1452.  In 
distinguishing between impermissible quid pro quo 
corruption and mere ingratiation and access, the 
First Amendment dictates that any uncertainty be 
resolved in favor of protecting political speech rather 
than suppressing it.  McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1451.  
And this Court has “consistently rejected attempts to 
suppress campaign speech based on other legislative 
objectives.”  Id. at 1450.   
In Citizens United, the Court was unequivocal 
that independent expenditures are by definition not 
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coordinated with candidates and as a matter of law 
cannot lead to the appearance of quid pro quo 
corruption.  Id. at 357, 360; see also Am. Tradition 
P’ship, v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) 
(striking down a state law banning corporations from 
making expenditures in connection with a candidate 
or a political committee that supports or opposes a 
candidate or political party).   
Under the logic of Citizens United, it follows—as 
even the Commission has recognized12—that (1) 
soliciting, receiving, and spending money to make 
non-contribution expenditures, while (2) 
independently making direct candidate contributions 
from a separate account that is separately funded 
and subject to amount and source restrictions does 
not risk the appearance of, or actual, quid pro quo 
corruption beyond the scope of the direct 
contributions themselves.     
But any risk of quid pro quo corruption posed by 
the direct contributions already is resolved by the 
direct contribution limits, anti-coordination laws, 
and anti-bribery laws.  See Republican Party of New 
Mexico, 741 F.3d at 1101 (“combining two activities, 
neither of which by itself is corrupting, into a single 
entity [does not] suddenly increase the risk of real or 
                                            
12 Under current FEC enforcement policy, non-connected 
political committees and non-profit entities may engage in 
unrestricted independent expenditures and [for non-connected 
political committees] restricted direct contributions so long as 
they use separate accounts.  See, e.g., FEC STATEMENT ON 
CAREY V. FEC, supra note 2; Explanation and Justification for 
Final Rules on Funds Received in Response to Solicitations, 75 
Fed. Reg. 13223, 13224 (Mar. 19, 2010). 
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apparent quid pro quo corruption”).  Indeed, the 
direct contribution limits themselves are merely a 
prophylactic measure “because few if any 
contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo 
arrangement.” McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1458 
(quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357).  Thus, 
restricting non-contribution activities on top of these 
laws stacks prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis.   
Similarly, to the extent that the government’s 
interest in preventing corruption also can encompass 
regulations that prevent circumvention of laws that 
prevent corruption—e.g., contribution limits—the 
segregated bank accounts,13 their attendant 
accounting requirements, and the other reporting 
requirements for PACs ensure that contributions 
designated for non-contribution activities will be 
used accordingly.14     
And once shorn of an anticorruption justification, 
there is no constitutionally sufficient interest in 
abridging a hybrid PAC’s non-contribution activities.     
The disclosure interest fares no better in 
justifying restrictions on political speech.  Although 
the D.C. Circuit is correct that the Court in 
McCutcheon recognized that disclosure requirements 
may “deter actual corruption and avoid the 
appearance of corruption by exposing large 
                                            
13 Indeed, this Court in McCutcheon proposed segregated, 
nontransferable accounts as an alternative to restricting direct 
contributions through aggregate limits.  Id. at 1458. 
14 Moreover, the restrictions are not narrowly tailored to any 
anti-circumvention corruption interest because multiple 
alternatives exist that do not stifle a hybrid PACs non-
contribution activities.  See id. (detailing alternatives that are 
less restrictive than aggregate limits on direct contributions). 
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contributions and expenditures to the light of 
publicity,” 134 S.Ct. at 1459-60 (quotation and marks 
omitted), it did not hold that these financial 
transactions must be publicly disclosed—only that 
disclosure may be adequate and is a constitutionally 
permissible means to achieve the anti-corruption 
interest.  Nor did it come close to suggesting that 
minor disclosure exemptions somehow justify 
otherwise-unconstitutional restrictions on political 
speech. 
The Court has sanctioned disclosure require-
ments because they are “a less restrictive alternative 
to flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech” 
and “do not impose a ceiling on speech.” Id.; Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 369.  See also Catholic 
Leadership Coalition, 2014 WL 3930139, at *15 n.25 
& 26 (questioning the permissibility of the D.C. 
Circuit’s efforts to link disclosure requirements to 
the anticorruption interest and recognizing that 
disclosure laws “are generally meant to be an 
alternative to, and not necessarily a justification for, 
the firm limits on political speech set by expenditure 
limits).   Indeed, the Court appears to have never 
held that it is constitutionally permissible to restrict 
contributions or expenditures simply by failing to 
require disclosure.   
To the contrary, in Citizens Against Rent Control 
v. Berkley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981), this Court rejected 
the government’s assertion that an ordinance 
limiting contributions to PACs formed to support or 
oppose ballot measures submitted to the public was 
necessary as a prophylactic measure to make known 
the identity of supporters and opponents of the 
measures.  Id. at 298-99.  The Court reasoned: “The 
integrity of the political system will be adequately 
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protected if contributors are identified in a public 
filing revealing the amounts contributed; if it is 
thought wise, legislation can outlaw anonymous 
contributions.”  Id. at 299-300.  Accordingly, because 
there was “no significant state or public interest in 
curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure,” 
the “limits on contributions which in turn limit[ed] 
expenditures plainly impair[ed] freedom of 
expression” and were struck down.  Id. 
 In any event, the restrictions here are 
asymmetrical to whatever merit a purported 
disclosure interest has in abridging ELF’s speech as 
applied.  The only thing ELF need not report are the 
operating costs STII may pay on its behalf with 
regard to its direct contribution activities.15  But 
STII already discloses its entire operating budget, as 
a 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporation, to the IRS on its 
annual form 990 or related forms.  Every other dollar 
received or disbursed in any way by ELF is disclosed.  
Indeed, ELF must report its non-contribution 
expenditures like all other PACs.  And like the 
regulatory scheme at issue in Citizens Against Rent 
Control, ELF must disclose contributions it receives 
over $200, including contributor name, address, 
occupation, and name of employer.  See 11 C.F.R. § 
104.3; 11 C.F.R. § 114.5.  See also Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 338 (detailing some of the disclosures 
connected PACs must make).  Likewise, the 
connected organization’s identity always is disclosed.  
                                            
15 ELF does not assert that payments by STII for costs to solicit 
the general public for its non-contribution account and 
activities are necessarily within the scope of the exemption to 
the definition of “contribution;” a determination properly left to 
the Court.    
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ELF—like all connected PACs—is required to use 
the connected organization’s name within its own 
name.  See 11 C.F.R. § 102.14(c). 
That ELF must disclose the names of its 
contributors exposes that the D.C. Circuit’s reliance 
on a purported disclosure interest is critically flawed.  
STII, as a 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporation, can accept 
unlimited amounts of donations but is not required 
to publicly disclose its donors.  The Court recently 
recognized this very point in McCutcheon: “The 
existing aggregate limits may in fact encourage the 
movement of money away from entities subject to 
disclosure . . . .  Individuals can, for example, 
contribute unlimited amounts to 501(c) 
organizations, which are not required to publicly 
disclose their donors.”  134 S.Ct. at 1460 (citing 26 
U.S.C. § 6104(d)(3)).  
Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s justification of the 
restrictions based on a disclosure interest and its 
admonishments that “[i]f the Fund wants to solicit 
freely, it must do so in the light” rings hollow.  
“Rhetoric ought not obscure reality.”  Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 355.   
II. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S DECISION CON-
FLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S HOLDING IN 
CITIZENS UNITED THAT THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT PROHIBITS POLITICAL 
SPEECH RESTRICTIONS BASED ON 
ORGANIZATIONAL FORM.   
Citizens United is unequivocal in establishing 
that the government cannot impose speech-based 
restrictions because the speaker is an association 
rather than a corporation, a union, or an individual.  
Id. at 342-43; First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
  
26
435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (“The inherent worth of the 
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the 
public does not depend on the identity of its source, 
whether corporation, association, union, or 
individual.”). Put simply, after Citizens United, the 
government cannot penalize “certain disfavored 
associations of citizens” because they opt for a 
particular organizational form.  558 U.S. at 356.16 
These principles extend to connected PACs like 
ELF, which is simply a collection of STII’s employees 
grouping together seeking to engage in political 
speech separately from STII and independently from 
any candidates or political parties.  See § 30101(4) 
(defining political committee).   
The D.C. Circuit, however, wrongly refused to 
apply Citizens United to this case.  First, the court 
distinguished Citizens United by conflating ELF’s 
separate speech rights with those of STII.  See App. 
7-8a (holding that Citizens United is inapposite 
because “[n]othing prevents the corporation from 
speaking on behalf of the PAC; in fact the regulatory 
scheme specifically provides for such activity, albeit 
with strings attached”).  This is flat wrong.17   
                                            
16 The Supreme Court has thus only recognized one narrow 
exception to the prohibition against identity-based 
distinctions—when the government performs a uniquely 
governmental function in limited settings, such as special 
restrictions within the military, corrections systems, and public 
schools.  See id.at 341 (cataloguing cases). 
17 The court also characterized Citizens United as “indicat[ing] 
these segregated funds were capable of speaking not unduly 
restrained by their various obligations” and that it never 
“suggest[ed] the statutory scheme for segregated funds 
‘muzzled’ their speech.”  App. 6-7a.  That this Court did not 
overturn the restrictions on connected PACs, however, is not 
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In Citizens United, this Court expressly 
recognized that a connected PAC is a separate 
association, distinct from its connected organization.  
558 U.S. at 337 (“A PAC is a separate association 
from the corporation.”).  Thus, the connected PAC’s 
speech rights could not be imputed to its connected 
organization.  Id. (the connected PAC’s “exemption 
from [§30118’s] expenditure ban . . . does not allow 
corporations to speak”).  And contrary to the D.C. 
Circuit’s characterization of ELF and STII as “two 
parts of the same whole,” see App.11a, they are not.   
Despite the D.C. Circuit’s skepticism that ELF 
has “a distinct set of constitutional protections 
attendant to it,” id., this Court has regularly 
reminded the lower courts that organizations such as 
connected PACs have First Amendment rights to 
engage in political speech.  See, e.g., Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 343; see also Catholic Leadership 
Coalition, 2014 WL 3930139, at *16 n.27.  Indeed, 
the Court has expressly rejected the notion that a 
connected PAC’s “form of organization or method of 
solicitation diminishes [its] entitlement to First 
Amendment protection.”   FEC v. Nat’l Conservative 
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 494 (1985).  
Further, the D.C. Circuit’s reliance on the fact 
that STII “begot the fund” and does not exist wholly 
                                                                                         
because it found them constitutionally permissible; rather, the 
restrictions on Citizens United’s speech was the particular 
burden on political speech that the Court faced in Citizens 
United.  See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2820 (2011) (rejecting Arizona’s 
attempt to distinguish Davis because “the reach of that opinion 
is limited to asymmetrical contribution limits.  It is because 
that was the particular burden on candidate speech we faced in 
Davis.”). 
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independent from STII could have dangerous, wide-
ranging implications.  Under its reasoning, the 
government could restrict the speech of wholly-
owned subsidiaries of corporations because they do 
not exist separately from the control of the company 
that owns them.  And no PAC or other association of 
individuals can exist separately from the desire of its 
contributors to speak.  That STII may pay for ELF’s 
administrative and solicitation costs does not 
transform ELF into a mere conduit for STII’s own 
speech.  
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether STII chooses 
to speak, how much it chooses to speak, or why it 
chooses to speak or not speak.  STII is a separate 
organization, and its ability to speak is no more 
justification for restricting ELF’s speech as does the 
right to speak of any other company, person, or 
organization.18 
The D.C. Circuit’s second reason for finding 
Citizens United inapposite fares no better.  
Specifically, it refused to sanction what it 
                                            
18 In any event, STII does not want to speak and it should not 
be forced to do so.  Its 501(c)(4) status was pending for more 
than three years during the time this case arose, which 
overlapped with the IRS scandal that occurred from May 2012 
through 2013, and is ongoing.  See, e.g., Richard Rubin, Big-
Money Politics Groups Get Clarity From IRS They Hate, 
BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-19/big-
money-politics-groups-get-clarity-from-irs-they-hate.html.  And 
now, as a 501(c)(4), it is subject to amorphous and confusing 
rules about how much political speech it may make before it 
risks losing its exempt status.  See, e.g., DANIEL WERFEL, IRS, 
CHARTING A PATH FORWARD AT THE IRS: INITIAL ASSESSMENT 
AND PLAN OF ACTION 22, 24-25 (June 24, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/IRS_InitialAs
sessmentAndPlanOfAction-2013.pdf. 
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characterized as the “illogical conclusion” that 
Citizens United permits STII and its employees’ to 
“do things the hard way”—namely, that instead of 
forming a non-connected PAC, they voluntarily 
choose a connected PAC despite knowing that 
subsidization of their operating costs would require 
them to trade their speech rights.  App.8-9a.   
Citizens United is not inapposite merely because 
STII and its employees had the idea to form a 
connected PAC.  Connected PACs do not cede their 
First Amendment rights simply by organizing in a 
way that allows them to receive operating expenses 
from another organization without disclosing the 
amount of operating expenses they receive.  Rather, 
the court’s reasoning otherwise is based on two 
flawed premises: (1) that Congress’s grant of an 
exemption enables it to require fundamental speech 
rights as the “trade-off”; and (2) the availability of 
other avenues of speech for an association’s 
constituent parts excuses the imposition of an 
unconstitutional speech burden.   
Connected PACs are, to be sure, given a 
statutory exemption that Congress is under no 
obligation to confer.  But so too are other associations 
and private individuals given all sorts of special 
advantages that the government need not confer, 
ranging from tax breaks to contract awards to public 
employment to outright cash subsidies.  See Austin v. 
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  And if the disclosure 
exemption creates an unfair advantage or something 
that “no political action committee has,” see App. 10a, 
it is Congress’s role, not the Judiciary’s, to eliminate 
the “advantage” through methods that do not 
unnecessarily abridge the fundamental rights to 
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speech and association to which connected PACs and 
their contributors are entitled.  See McCutcheon, 134 
S.Ct. at 1458 (“If Congress agrees that [the ability of 
party committees to transfer money freely] is 
problematic, it might tighten its permissive transfer 
rules.  Doing so would impose a lesser burden on 
First Amendment rights, as compared to aggregate 
limits that flatly ban contributions beyond certain 
levels.”). 
It is a bedrock constitutional principle that the 
government cannot exact as the price of a benefit the 
forfeiture of First Amendment rights.  Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 351 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  See also Catholic Leadership Coalition, 
2014 WL 3930139, *16 n. 27 (rejecting the state’s 
argument that because it grants special privileges to 
certain types of PACs, it may regulate them as it 
pleases without speech restrictions having to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny).  But that is 
exactly the effect of the D.C. Circuit’s decision.  
Congress has not yet changed disclosure require-
ments for connected PACs in light of Citizens United.  
But such Congressional inaction cannot justify the 
continued unconstitutional suppression of ELF’s 
independent speech.   
Importantly, under the D.C. Circuit’s logic, the 
government could simply undo Citizens United and 
restrict the speech of corporations, labor unions, non-
connected PACs and non-profit entities simply by 
granting even minor disclosure exemptions.  If the 
government can strip constitutional rights by 
granting purportedly offsetting statutory benefits, no 
speaker is safe from Congress’s generosity.   
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Second, under Citizens United and others, the 
availability of other avenues of speech for an 
association’s constituent parts does not excuse the 
imposition of an unconstitutional burden on 
organizations wanting to engage in speech.  See, e.g., 
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411, n.4 (1974) 
(per curiam) (Although a prohibition’s effect may be 
“‘minuscule and trifling,’” a person “‘is not to have 
the exercise of his liberty of expression in 
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may 
be exercised in some other place’”) (quotation 
omitted).  Indeed, at the time Citizens United was 
decided, the Citizens United organization operated a 
connected PAC for a decade and made candidate 
contributions.  But this did not prevent the Court 
from implicitly rejecting Justice Stevens’ position 
that if Citizens United wanted to speak right before 
the primary, all it needed to do was “abjure business 
contributions or use the funds in its PAC, which by 
its own account is “one of the most active 
conservative PACs in America.”  558 U.S. at 419 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  See also McConnell v. FEC, 
540 U.S. 93, 256 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(banning newspapers’ use of the partnership form 
“would be an obvious violation of the First 
Amendment, and it is incomprehensible why the 
conclusion should change when what is at issue is 
the pooling of funds for the most important (and 
most perennially threatened) category of speech: 
electoral speech”); Tex. for Free Enter. v. Tex. Ethics 
Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 539 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting 
state’s argument that “corporations have plenty of 
other opportunities for speech—they may speak 
themselves or create their own independent PACs” 
because this Court has expressly rejected that line of 
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reasoning (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357)).  
The Act’s limitations on connected PACs must rise 
and fall on their own merits. 
III. THIS CASE PRESENTS QUESTIONS OF 
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE THAT 
SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THIS COURT.  
1. Connected PACs are a major avenue for 
political speech.  Thus, the question of what 
restrictions on them are constitutionally allowable is 
exceptionally important.  As of June 30, 2014, of the 
5,618 PACs registered with the FEC, 3,042—over 
54%—are connected PACs.19  So, far from a “vintage 
relic,” App. 6a, this case presents relevant issues for 
more than half of the federally-registered PACs in 
existence today and any ruling by this Court will 
impact the thousands of PACs that hold this form.   
Even if true, the D.C. Circuit’s characterization 
of connected PACs as “the hard way” of engaging in 
associational political speech because they “are no 
longer necessary for independent expenditures,” App. 
6a, also does not dilute their entitlement to 
protection under the First Amendment.  That STII’s 
employees voluntarily chose to organize ELF as a 
connected PAC is not “doing things the hard way.”  It 
is doing things the “legal and congressionally 
sanctioned way.”  Their choice of that available mode 
of expression is still protected:  the First Amendment 
mandates that “citizens must be able to discuss 
                                            
19 See FEC, PAC Count – 1974 to Present, 
http://www.fec.gov/press/resources/paccount.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2014).  In contrast, only 1,701 are Non-connected 
PACs, 796 are Independent Expenditure-Only PACs (Super 
PACs), and 79 are Non-connected PACs with Non-contribution 
accounts. 
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issues, great or small, through the means of 
expression they deem best suited to their purpose.”  
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 781 (2000); Riley v. 
Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 
790–791 (1988); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 
(1988).   
And necessary or not, connected PACs exist.  
Even if the lowly connected PAC organizational form 
is utilized, the association has political speech rights 
after Citizens United that cannot be infringed upon 
for naught.  And after Citizens United, “any effort by 
the Judiciary to decide which means of communi-
cations are to be preferred for the particular type of 
message and speaker would raise questions as to the 
courts’ own lawful authority.”  See 558 U.S. at 326. 
2. Without the Court’s intervention, there is no 
clear answer as to whether laws that burden the 
non-contribution activities of these hybrid PACs are 
constitutional.  The deadlock in the circuits—both on 
the constitutionality of restrictions on hybrid PACs 
non-contribution activities and on the sufficiency of 
the disclosure interest—is clear evidence of the 
confusion.   
Further, currently, at least 15 states allow some 
form of a hybrid PAC, and the Commission similarly 
has consented to non-connected PACs making both 
restricted direct contributions and unrestricted non-
contribution expenditures from separate segregated 
accounts. 20  Absent clarity from this court, improper 
interpretation will continue to chill, or risk chilling, 
                                            
20 These include Texas, New Mexico, Alabama, California, 
Delaware, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Utah, and Virginia.  
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this most fundamental speech.  See Citizens United, 
333-34; see also U.S. v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335 
U.S. 106, 139-40 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring) 
(“when regulation or prohibition touches [the making 
of political contributions and expenditures], this 
Court is duty bound to examine the restrictions and 
to decide in its own independent judgment whether 
they are abridged within the Amendment’s meaning.  
That office cannot be surrendered to legislative 
judgment, however weighty”). 
3. Lastly, the rights at issue here are of the 
utmost importance, necessitating the Court’s 
intervention.  It is unassailable that political speech 
is the primary object of First Amendment protection.  
See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).  
And “[b]ecause the FEC’s business is to censor, there 
inheres the danger that [it] may well be less 
responsive than a court . . . to the constitutionally 
protected interests in free expression.’”  Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 355 (quoting Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965)).  ELF deserves 
court protection now because the right to engage in 
political speech is not a boon to be awarded or 
restricted at the grace of the Commission or 
Congress.  Rather, it is a fundamental right of every 
person that may not be restricted under the First 
Amendment absent an appropriately tailored 
restriction that furthers a sufficient government 
interest. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be 
granted and the judgment below reversed.  
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